ABA comment letter writing guide: Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins by Entities Subject to the Jurisdiction of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

A. Introduce Your Bank. [Asset size, footprint, primary federal regulator, business model, etc.]

B. Thank the agencies.  Share your appreciation for the opportunity to comment on the proposed rule from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) on implementing the GENIUS Act. Thank OCC for their commitment to establishing a clear regulatory framework for payment stablecoins that support responsible innovation while protecting consumers and maintaining a safe and stable financial system.

Key Issues You May Wish to Address:

[Insert bank-specific examples where appropriate]

Possible points to include:

• The OCC should flatly prohibit direct and indirect yield payments to ensure the GENIUS Act’s prohibition is enforced and cannot be engineered around through creative structuring or labeling.
• The OCC’s interpretation of the prohibition should include all scenarios when a permitted payment stablecoin issuer (PPSI) provides funds or economic value to any affiliate or partner that then delivers yield-like benefits to holders, regardless of how the upstream payment between the PPSI and affiliate or partner is labeled.

Example language:

The OCC’s proposed approach to interest and yield prohibition is a constructive step, but it does not go far enough. The rule should explicitly prohibit both direct and indirect payments of interest or yield, and not merely create a test tied to narrowly defined arrangements. Sophisticated issuers can and will engineer around unclear rulemakings and enumerated examples. A flat prohibition against direct and indirect interest and yield payments, supplemented by illustrative examples closes regulatory and statutory gaps. The GENIUS Act was written to ensure stablecoins function as a means of payment and do not disintermediate bank deposits; the final rule must be drafted to enforce that intent.

Possible points to include:

• The OCC must build a durable prudential architecture for payment stablecoin issuance from the outset, with standardized capital floors and hard structural guardrails rather than deferring key calibration questions to supervisory discretion or future guidance. A product, like payment stablecoin, with the potential for systemic significance deserves the same rigor as the banking framework applies to banks from day one.
• The OCC should provide a standardized, objective capital methodology that ensures transparency and consistent standards across issuer types. Bank-affiliated issuers operate under clear capital requirements from day one; the final rule should establish a framework for PPSIs that reflects the same rigor and clarity, appropriately calibrated to the risks presented by different PPSI business models.
• The OCC should apply robust, consistent risk management standards to all PPSIs regardless of size to promote regulatory clarity and a common safety and soundness baseline.
• PPSIs should be treated as financial institutions under GLBA’s Safeguards Rule and FFIEC IT examination standards to ensure a level playing field with traditional banks and protect consumers.

Example language:

The OCC must establish clear, consistent, and appropriately calibrated standards across the three areas addressed below.

On capital, the OCC should adopt a standardized, objective methodology that ensures transparency and parity across issuer types. Bank-affiliated issuers already operate under well-defined capital requirements; the final rule should extend equivalent rigor and clarity to PPSIs, with calibration that reflects the distinct risk profiles of different PPSI business models.

On risk management, the OCC should apply robust and consistent standards to all PPSIs regardless of size, establishing a common safety and soundness baseline and promoting regulatory clarity across the payment stablecoin ecosystem.

On data security and privacy, PPSIs should be treated as financial institutions subject to GLBA’s Safeguards Rule and FFIEC IT examination standards. This approach would ensure a level playing field with traditional banks and provide consumers with consistent protections regardless of issuer type.

Possible points to include:

• The OCC should adopt a stress-tested reserve framework calibrated and resilient enough to withstand extreme market conditions.
• The reserve framework should incorporate liquidity and interest rate stress tests, and the OCC should consider a framework aligned with money market mutual fund and runoff best practices.
• Robust liquidity buffers and stress testing should account for extreme scenarios and extraordinary events, including system-wide confidence shocks and de-pegging.

Example language:

 A well-calibrated reserve and liquidity framework should incorporate liquidity and interest rate stress testing, and the OCC should look to money market fund best practices as an appropriate reference point.

Robust liquidity buffers and stress testing must account for extreme scenarios, including system-wide confidence shocks and de-pegging events, not merely baseline conditions. A framework that fails to stress-test for tail risks would provide only illusory protection and undermine confidence in the stability of payment stablecoins at precisely the moments that matter most. 

Possible points to include:

• Issuers organized as a subsidiary of an insured depository institution and bank custodians already operate under rigorous supervision and industry standards that address the risks these rules target.
• Reserve concentration limits and monetization demonstrations requirements should be calibrated to reflect existing frameworks and avoid duplicative burdens where current supervision and industry standards already achieve the rule’s objectives.
• The OCC’s custody framework should conform to current market practice and norms for reserve asset custody and build on the established legal and operational infrastructure that banks already use to safeguard customer assets, rather than imposing novel obligations that depart from those standards.
• For issuers organized as a subsidiary of an insured depository institution, the OCC should permit reliance on the parent institution’s existing enterprise risk management frameworks provided there is explicit, documented linkage to the PPSI’s specific activities and risk profile.

Example Language

Issuers organized as a subsidiary of an insured depository institution and bank custodians already operate within comprehensive supervisory frameworks that address the core risks the proposed rules target. Requirements such as reserve concentration limits and monetization demonstrations should be calibrated to existing supervisory expectations rather than imposed as standalone obligations, and the OCC should avoid duplicative burdens where current supervision already achieves the rule’s objectives.

The OCC’s custody framework should build on established market norms and existing legal and operational infrastructure rather than imposing novel obligations that depart from current practice.

The OCC should permit issuers organized as a subsidiary of an insured depository institution to satisfy risk management requirements by reference to the parent institution’s existing framework, provided that framework is explicitly documented to encompass the PPSI’s specific activities and risk profile.

Possible points to include:

• The OCC, in coordination with other regulators, should strengthen the NPRM’s consumer protection provisions by specifying disclosure requirements, clarifying unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices (“UDAAP”) applicability, and addressing Electronic Fund Transfer Act’s (EFTA) application to payment stablecoin transfers consistent with protections available for comparable payment products.
• The NPRM’s current consumer protection provisions are an inadequate substitute for affirmative federal rulemaking; comparable payment products are subject to robust federal protections in each of these areas, and payment stablecoins should be no different.

Example language:

The NPRM’s consumer protection provisions fall short of the standards applicable to comparable payment products, and the final rule should close that gap through affirmative federal rulemaking and regulatory coordination rather than leaving consumers to navigate inconsistent state law and issuer discretion.

On disclosures, the OCC should establish clear requirements for both issuers and intermediaries covering timing, content, and the respective roles of each party in ensuring consumers understand the risks of payment stablecoins. On UDAAP, the OCC should coordinate with applicable federal regulators to clarify how unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts or practices prohibitions apply to payment stablecoin issuers and transactions, ensuring consumers have meaningful recourse against bad actors. On error resolution and unauthorized transfers, the OCC should similarly coordinate with applicable federal regulators to clarify how EFTA applies to payment stablecoin transfers, including consumer liability limits, dispute resolution procedures, and periodic statement requirements. Taken together, these gaps risk creating a two-tiered consumer protection landscape in which users of payment stablecoins receive materially weaker protections than users of functionally equivalent products. The final rule should address this directly.

End your comment by summarizing your key points and thanking the agency for considering your views.

Example closing language

We appreciate the OCC’s efforts to implement the GENIUS Act and establish a regulatory framework for payment stablecoins.

It is important that the final rule protects consumers, supports responsible innovation, and maintains the safety and stability of the U.S. financial system.

Thank you for the opportunity to comment.